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ABSTRACT
Many cybersecurity attacks rely on analyzing a binary executable to
find exploitable sections of code. Code obfuscation is used to prevent
attackers from reverse engineering these executables. In this work,
we focus on control flow obfuscation - a technique that prevents
attackers from statically determining which code segments are
original, and which segments are added in to confuse attackers. We
propose a RISC-V-based hardware-assisted deobfuscation technique
that deobfuscates code at runtime based on a secret safely stored in
hardware, along with an LLVM compiler extension for obfuscating
binaries. Unlike conventional tools, our work does not rely on
compiling hard-to-reverse-engineer code, but on securing a secret
key. As such, it can be seen as a lightweight alternative to on-the-fly
binary decryption.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Attackers may want to steal sensitive data or cryptographic keys
from a system. To mount their attacks they have to find an appropri-
ate location in the targeted software. Attackers attempt to reverse
engineer the targeted executables in order to find exploitable sec-
tions of code. To prevent reverse engineering, software vendors
resort to various kinds of software obfuscations. One of the most
effective obfuscation targets is the program’s control flow (CF). CF
obfuscation is a technique in which a dedicated program called the
obfuscator performs semantic-preserving transformations on the
original program in order to hide the original control flow. This
kind of obfuscation heavily relies on opaque predicates. A predicate
is opaque if its resolution is hard or ambiguous for the attacker. The
technique of opaque predicates is used in obuscation tools such as
Obfuscator-LLVM [3]. The construction of an opaque predicate is
usually done by tailoring a computationally intensive or even un-
computable challenge for the underlying concolic execution engine
such as present in BAP [2]. Some of the challenges proposed by
Xu et. al. [4] are: symbolic memory, floating-point algebra, covert
symbolic propagation and parallel programming. Even though one
may construct multiple different concrete challenges from the same
basic ideas, they rarely pose a theoretical barrier to reverse engi-
neering but rather technical difficulties. Such technical difficulties
get eliminated by enhancements in concolic engines as soon as their
authors implement the missing part that allows for the difficulty to
surface.
Whole-executable encryption is a plausible alternative to control
flow obfuscation. However, this approach incurs its own hazards.
The decryption keys need to be stored securely, and the decrypted
binary cannot be stored in off-chip memory at any moment in
time. If an executable has to be decrypted before execution, that
has to be done in a safe environment (enclave) such as offered
by Intel’s SGX [1]. Furthermore, on-the-fly decryption incurs a
significant performance penalty which this work aims to avoid.
This work proposes the idea of hardware-assisted CF obfuscation
whose integrity relies on a secret that is available only to the trusted
party, like an unclonable hardware module. This approach does not
depend on the ability of an attacker or concolic execution engine
to evaluate particular portion of computation as long as the secret
is kept safe.
2 OBFUSCATION PROCESS
The essence of our approach relies on potentially reversing all
the conditional branches in the original program. The obfuscator
decides whether to revert a branch by calculating a function that
takes two inputs: (1) a ID of the branch, and (2) a program key. If
the function returns a 1, the branch condition is reversed, otherwise
it is not. In our implementation, we use a cryptographic hash with
a binary output. Hence, the only part of secret information is the
program key.
Listing 1 shows a segment of a C program that is compiled using
our branch obfuscator. Listing 2 shows the assembly of the original
program. Assuming that the hash function reverses both branches,
obfuscated RISC-V assembly is shown in Listing 3.
Listing 1: C code of the original program
. . .
i f ( n < 5 )
p r i n t f ( " Your ␣ number ␣ i s ␣ lower ␣ than ␣ 5 \ n " ) ;
i f ( n > 1 2 )
p r i n t f ( " Higher ␣ than ␣ 1 2 \ n " ) ;
. . .
Listing 2: Plain code
main :
. . .
a dd i a1 , zero , 4
b l t a1 , a0 , . LBB0_2
j . LBB0_1
. LBB0_1 :
l u i a0 , %h i ( . L . s t r . 2 )
add i a0 , a0 , % l o ( . L . s t r . 2 )
c a l l p r i n t f
j . LBB0_2
. LBB0_2 :
lw a0 , −16( s0 )
add i a1 , zero , 13
b l t a0 , a1 , . LBB0_4
j . LBB0_3
Listing 3: Obfuscated code
main :
. . .
addi a1, zero, 5
blt a0, a1, .LBB0_2
j . LBB0_1
. LBB0_1 :
l u i a0 , %h i ( . L . s t r . 2 )
add i a0 , a0 , % l o ( . L . s t r . 2 )
c a l l p r i n t f
j . LBB0_2
. LBB0_2 :
lw a0 , −16( s0 )
addi a1, zero, 12
blt a1, a0, .LBB0_4
j . LBB0_3
The obfuscator itself is implemented as an LLVM Pass - the same
technique that the LLVM compiler infrastructure uses internally for
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its optimizations. The place of the obfuscator in the LLVM compi-
lation chain is given in Figure 1. It performs branch obfuscation on
LLVM internal representation (IR) and thus supports all program-
ming languages with compilers that target LLVM IR. This group of
programming languages includes C, C++, Rust, Apple Swift and oth-
ers. The resulting LLVM IR is then passed to the RISC-V compiler
backend that emits obfuscated RISC-V assembly.
LLVM core
define dso_local i32 @main() #0
{
 %1 = alloca i32, align 4
 store i32 0, i32* %1, align 4
 ret i32 513
}
main:
    addi sp, sp, -16
    sw ra, 12(sp)
    sw s0, 8(sp)
    addi s0, sp, 16
    sw zero, -12(s0)
    addi a0, zero, 513
    hw s0, 8(sp)
    hw ra, 12(sp)
    addi sp,sp, 16
    ret
LLVM
frontend
LLVM
backendclang++ main.cpp
rustc main.rs
clang main.c
swiftc main.swift
Branch obfuscator
RISC-V
Figure 1: Place of the obfuscator in LLVMcompilation chain.
3 DEOBFUSCATION PROCESS
The obfuscated program correctly executes only on a trusted RISC-
V core designed to support deobfuscation. We outline four designs
here: the baseline, stalled-hash, mask-based, and the cached-hash
design.
Baseline design: the baseline design is a 7-stage RISC-V CPUwith-
out any hardware modifications enabling obfuscation. A simplified
processor architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The original 7-stage pipeline RISC-V processor.
Stalled-hash design: here, the baseline CPU is equpped with a
hardware hash function. When a branch instruction is in the decode
stage, the hash function is fed the branch instruction address and
the program key. When the branch instruction reaches the execute
stage, all the stages up to and including the execute stage are stalled
until the hash function produces an output. Once a (single bit)
output is produced, that value is XOR-ed with the branch signal.
This way, branches that would be taken may not be, and vice-versa.
The modified architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The original 7-stage pipeline RISC-V processor
modified to XOR branch values with hash function outputs.
Mask-based design: instructions are extended with a mask bit.
The mask bit specifies whether a branch should be reversed or not.
Having an independent mask bit per each branch removes the pos-
sibility of an attacker predicting future branches based on existing
ones. However, widening the instruction word width complicates
the design of L2 caches and memory controllers. Furthermore, the
masks need to be kept encrypted in memory and decrypted on-the-
fly.
Cached-hash design: in this design, we add a hash-cache to the
stalled-hash design.When a branch is in the decode, the architecture
in parallel starts calculating the hash function and checks the cache
for whether that branch’s hash has previously been calculated. If
not, when the hash function finishes, it both feeds the value to the
XOR gate, and saves the result in the cache. If the value is found in
the cache, it is sent to the XOR, just in time as the branch enters
the execute stage. In our experiments we used a simple 256-line,
one branch per line, direct-mapped cache.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We simulate the four architectures listed above. The baseline and
the mask-based architectures have the same performance, so we
omit the second one. Further, we test two different hash-based
architectures with an 8 and a 16-cycle hash function. In Figure 4,
we see the performance of different architectures on 6 different
PARSEC tasks. Notice that for the 16-cycle hash, the processor can
slow down as much as 60%. However, adding a (256-line, single
branch hash per line) direct-mapped cache removes the majority
of the performance overhead.
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Figure 4: The performance of the five architectures on 6
PARSEC tasks, measured in cycles.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work we have explored custom hardware for efficient binary
control flow obfuscation. We have presented our extensions to the
LLVM compiler which allow simple compile-time obfuscation. Next,
we have shown several architectures that allow on-chip deobfusca-
tion of code. Finally, we have measured the performance penalty
of these hardware modifications and have shown that our cached-
hash-based implementation achieves full control flow obfuscation
with a small performance penalty.
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